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Abstract: Many philosophers hold constitutive theories of self-
knowledge in the sense that they think either that a person’s 
psychological states depend upon her having true beliefs about them, 
or that a person’s believing that she is in a particular psychological 
state depends upon her actually being in that state. One way to 
support this type of view can be found in Shoemaker’s well-known 
argument that an absurd condition, which he calls “self-blindness”, 
would be possible if a subject’s psychological states and her higher-
order beliefs about them were wholly distinct existences. A second 
reason to endorse a constitutive theory is the widespread conviction 
that first-person access is epistemically special. In this essay, I shall 
argue that even if self-blindness is impossible, the best explanation 
for this does not deny that a person’s psychological states are wholly 
distinct from her beliefs about them. I shall then attempt to account 
for the epistemic distinctiveness of first-person access on the basis 
of fundamental features of rational cognition. One advantage of this 
account over constitutive theories of self-knowledge is that it is better 
placed to explain our fallibility and ignorance. 
In order for me to know about another person’s psychological states, 
I must observe her in some way. I have to see what she is doing or 
listen to what she is saying before I can know what is on her mind. 
Because observation is, either directly or indirectly, necessary for my 
becoming aware of another person’s mind, I can be, and sometimes 
am, mistaken about what other people are thinking. Notably, it seems 
possible for me to be wrong about what another person is thinking or 
feeling even in cases where my beliefs about the other person’s mind 
are fully justified. The possibility of this kind of perception-based error 
suggests that another person’s psychological state is independent 
from my beliefs about it. In Hume’s words, the two seem to be distinct 
existences. 
Things are different in my own case. I do not normally rely on 
sensory perception in order to know what I think, or want, or intend. 
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Yet there are different ways in which a constitutive theorist can think 
of the underlying relation that holds between a subject’s psychological 
states and her higher-order beliefs about them. Like Boyle, one could 
think of the relation as identity; that is, one could think that my 
believing that P just is my believing that I believe that P. Alternatively, 
one could think of the relation as a type of essential mereological 
relation. For example, one could think that my higher-order belief that 
I believe that P is an essential part of what it is to believe that P and so 
not wholly distinct. Or, following Sydney Shoemaker, one could think 
that the belief that I believe that P “has the belief that p as an essential 
part”, such that “its possession cannot survive the loss of the belief that 
p” (2009, pg. 42).4 
Regardless, what these different constitutive theories have in 
common is their opposition to the natural thought that being in a 
psychological state is one thing and having a belief about it is another 
thing. I propose to capture this thought by negating two claims: 
Distinct Existence Thesis: For any subject a and psychological 
state M: (i) it is not the case that part of what it is for a to 
be in M is for a to believe (first-personally) that a is in 
then I believe that I believe P’ will have trivial truth conditions (cf. Rayo 2013). 
This suggests, as Boghossian (1989) argued, that constitutive theories make 
self-knowledge neither a cognitive nor an epistemic achievement (however, 
see Rayo [2009] for an argument that acquiring knowledge of trivial claims 
can be a cognitive achievement).  
4. In his (1994), Shoemaker spells out the relevant relation in terms of the 
realizers of psychological states and of higher-order beliefs. In fact, he 
presents two proposals. First, he claims that a’s being in M and a’s believing 
that a is in M might have different core realizations but “their total realizations 
overlap in a certain way” (pg. 288). Second, he proposes that “it might be that 
they have the same core realization and that the total realization of the first-
order state is a proper part of the total realization of the first-person belief 
that one has it” (pg. 288). It is worth noting that since Shoemaker clearly 
intends for the relation between one’s psychological states and one’s true 
higher-order beliefs about them to hold with necessity, he can’t be thinking 
of either overlap or proper parthood as contingent relations, which is perhaps 
why he frames his proposals in terms of the “essence” of psychological states. 
Instead, it seems that I have a special kind of epistemic access to my 
own psychological states. This first-person access is unavailable to 
other people. They can never know about my psychological states in 
the special way that I typically do. However, having this special mode 
of access makes it much less clear whether my psychological states are 
wholly distinct from my beliefs about them. Indeed, many philosophers 
think the two are not wholly distinct existences.1 For example, Matthew 
Boyle denies that “being in a given mental state M and believing 
oneself to be in M are two distinct psychological conditions” (2011, 
pg. 235). Instead, Boyle thinks the two are simply different aspects, 
or “ways of conceiving”, the very same psychological state. Thus, on 
Boyle’s view, the relation between a subject’s psychological state and 
her higher-order belief about it is identity. 
In recent years, several philosophers have explicitly defended 
“constitutive theories” of self-knowledge. The majority of these 
theorists deny that a subject’s psychological states are wholly distinct 
from her own higher-order beliefs about them.2 Instead, they maintain 
either that part of what it is to be in a psychological state M is to believe 
that one is in M, or that part of what it is to believe that one is in M is 
to actually be in M.3 
1. I intend ‘wholly distinct’ to mean that there are no necessary connections 
between the two entities. As Wilson (2010) shows, there are weaker senses 
of ‘distinct’ which allow for ‘distinct existences’ to stand in certain kinds of 
necessary relations to one another.   
2. In addition to Boyle, constitutive theories are proposed by Bilgrami (2006, 
2010), Coliva (2008), Heal (2001), Horgan and Kriegel (2007), Rödl (2007), 
Shoemaker (1994; 2012), and Zimmerman (2006). An important exception 
to what I say in this essay is Crispin Wright, who in various papers (1992, 
1998, 2012) has defended a kind of anti-realist, “deflationary”, account of self-
knowledge that he sometimes refers to as a “constitutive” theory (although 
in recent work he concedes that this label may be misleading). Because 
Wright’s view concerns constitutive conditions on the way we treat avowals 
of psychological states, it is not committed to denying that a subject’s 
psychological states are wholly distinct from her higher-order beliefs about 
them. It therefore need not be opposed to the thesis I defend in this essay. 
3. Rayo (2009) calls “part of what it is to be” claims like these “semi-identities” 
and argues that they entail sentences with trivial truth conditions. So, if either 
of these semi-identities were true for psychological states and higher-order 
beliefs about them, then we should expect that sentences like ‘If I believe P, 
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accepts the Distinct Existence Thesis is committed to denying both of 
these modal claims and maintaining instead that any relation between 
a’s belief that she is M and a’s being in M is contingent.  
There are a couple of simple considerations that seem to speak 
in favor of the Distinct Existence Thesis. First there is Hume’s doctrine 
that, since all psychological states are distinguishable in thought, 
“they may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to 
support their existence”.7 Prima facie, Hume’s remark seems plausible. 
It seems that we can imagine a world in which a person believes that 
P without believing that she believes that P and also a world in which 
a person believes that she believes that P but actually does not. But 
if the Distinct Existence Thesis were false, these imagined scenarios 
would be impossible. Naturally, a contemporary philosopher might 
insist that Hume illegitimately presupposes that our imagination 
reliably indicates metaphysical possibility. But, even if we reject 
this presupposition, we might nonetheless think that being able to 
imagine these sorts of cases offers us at least some prima facie reason 
for thinking they are possible. After all, we might note that at least in 
paradigm cases where part of what it is to be F is to be G, a world in 
which an object is F but not G seems to be completely unimaginable. 
For example, it is extremely difficult to imagine a scarlet object that is 
not also red. 
Secondly, it seems that we can be both ignorant of and mistaken 
about our own psychological states. We sometimes believe or desire 
something without believing that we do, and we are sometimes wrong 
about our own beliefs and desires (Schwitzgebel, 2008; Snowdon 
2012). The combination of ignorance and error in this domain suggests 
that the Distinct Existence Thesis is true. More precisely, the possibility 
of ignorance suggests that clause (i) of the thesis is true, and the 
possibility of error suggests that clause (ii) is true. 
Someone who is resistant to the Distinct Existence Thesis might 
think that one or both of these possibilities are exceedingly rare. That 
7. Treatise 1.4.5.5. 
M, and (ii) it is not the case that part of what it is for a to 
believe (first-personally) that a is in M is for a to be in M. 5 
Constitutive theories of self-knowledge, as I shall understand them, 
either explicitly deny or are committed to rejecting the Distinct 
Existence Thesis. 
Rejecting this thesis amounts to endorsing the idea that part of 
what it is to be in a certain kind of psychological state is to be in another 
kind of psychological state. Thus, constitutive theories are committed 
to some type of modal truth. This is because the “part of what it is 
to be” operator has modal implications.6 Specifically, the proposition 
negated in (i) entails the corresponding modal statement: necessarily 
(if a is in M, then a believes (first-personally) that a is in M). Similarly, 
the proposition denied in (ii) entails the corresponding modal 
statement: necessarily (if a believes [first-personally] that a is in M, then 
a is in M). It follows that someone who rejects both conjuncts of the 
Distinct Existence Thesis would commit herself to the kind of necessary 
bi-conditional one finds explicitly endorsed by several constitutive 
theorists (e.g., Bilgrami 2006; Coliva 2012). By contrast, someone who 
5. Constitutive theories are quite often characterized in terms of the following 
bi-conditional: necessarily, M(a) iff a believes that M(a). The problem with 
this is that the simple truth of the bi-conditional does not explain the relation 
between M(a) and a’s higher-order belief that M(a). There is therefore no 
reason why such a bi-conditional could not turn out to be true of wholly distinct 
states, indeed no reason why it could not be accidentally true (for more on 
necessary connections holding between distinct states, see Wilson [2010]). 
This is why Wright’s account does not need to deny the Distinct Existence 
Thesis — the heart of his proposal is that the bi-conditional is primitively 
true. In this formulation of the Distinct Existence Thesis, the qualification ‘first-
personally’ is needed to rule out impertinent counterexamples generated by 
the referential opacity of the belief context: for example, a case in which a 
cannot remember who she is, but nevertheless believes of herself that she is 
in M (for discussion of these sorts of cases, see Rumfitt [1994]). For ease of 
prose, I will often leave the qualification implicit in what follows.  
6. This is plausibly because the operator picks out (partially) the identity 
conditions of the entity in question. Therefore, in claiming that part of what it 
is to be X is to be Y, one is saying something stronger than that X is partially 
constituted by Y.    
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argue that even if self-blindness is impossible the best explanation for 
this does not deny the Distinct Existence Thesis. In sections three and 
four, I draw on recent work on self-knowledge and rationality in order 
to present an account of first-person access that respects its epistemic 
distinctiveness, but is also consistent with the Distinct Existence Thesis. 
The account I present is inspired by Richard Moran’s work on self-
knowledge, and it maintains that a rational subject with the capacity 
to consciously self-ascribe a psychological attitude must ordinarily 
take her attitudes to depend on her assessment of reasons. I shall 
argue that meeting this condition on rationality requires one to have 
a capacity for first-person access which is epistemically distinctive in 
two respects. In the final section of the essay, I consider an objection 
to this proposal, and then I argue that, because the Distinct Existence 
Thesis allows us to make better sense of self-ignorance and error, we 
should prefer theories of self-knowledge that are consistent with it.  
1. Self-Blindness
According to Shoemaker, “a self-blind creature would be one which 
has the conception of the various mental states, and can entertain 
the thought that it has this or that belief, desire, intention, etc., but 
which is unable to become aware of the truth of such a thought except 
in a third-person way” (1988, pg. 115). Self-blindness is supposed to 
be analogous to color-blindness. Just as a person who is color-blind 
can learn information about color in a non-standard way — through 
reading a book about colors, for instance — a person who is self-blind 
can learn about her own beliefs, desires, and intentions in a non-
standard way, which is to say a completely third-personal way. Instead 
of having first-person access to her psychological states, the self-blind 
person will have to make observations of her behavior in order to 
know what she believes, wants, or intends. Moreover, self-blindness is 
“supposed to be perceptual or quasi-perceptual, rather than cognitive 
or conceptual” (1988, pg. 118). For this reason, self-blindness is a 
is, someone might think that, in ordinary circumstances, we are not 
ignorant of our own psychological states. Similarly, one might think 
that, in optimal conditions for self-reflection, we are not mistaken 
about our own psychological states (cf. Shoemaker 1990). One 
might therefore think that, because they are, in some sense, non-
standard cases, the mere possibilities of ignorance or of error could be 
accommodated by a constitutive view that denies the Distinct Existence 
Thesis. We shall return to this issue in section 5.  
Neither of these two considerations amounts to a decisive argument 
for the Distinct Existence Thesis. But I do think they suggest that it is 
plausible and intuitive. In that case, however, one might wonder why 
so many philosophers endorse constitutive theories. One motivation 
is the widespread conviction that first-person access is epistemically 
unique or distinctive. Some philosophers worry that if the Distinct 
Existence Thesis were true, then our first-personal way of knowing about 
our own psychological states would be based on causal relations but, 
in that case, it would no longer be epistemically distinctive. It would 
too closely resemble perceptual knowledge of the external world. 
A second reason that one might endorse a constitutive theory 
is provided by a very influential argument presented by Sydney 
Shoemaker in a number of essays. Shoemaker’s argument maintains 
that if a subject’s psychological states were wholly distinct from her 
higher-order beliefs about them, then it would be possible for someone 
to suffer from a condition that he calls “self-blindness”. A person is self-
blind just in case she can know about her psychological states in only 
a third-personal way. Shoemaker argues that the possibility of self-
blindness is absurd and that for this reason a subject’s psychological 
states cannot be wholly distinct from her true higher-order beliefs 
about them. If his argument were sound, then the impossibility of self-
blindness would show that some type of constitutive theory must be 
true. 
The goal of this essay is to argue for a philosophical conception 
of self-knowledge that is consistent with the Distinct Existence Thesis, 
which is to say not a constitutive theory. In the first two sections, I shall 
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Shoemaker also presents what seems to be a second argument. He 
thinks that, because George has mastery of the concept of belief, the 
following two things will be true:
A) He will recognize that when asked “Do you believe that P?”, he 
ought to answer “Yes” just in case he would answer “Yes” to the 
question ‘Is it true P?’.
B) He will recognize the meaning of ‘believe’ and preface his assertions 
with ‘I believe’ in just the circumstances in which this is pragmatically 
appropriate. 
Plausibly, A) follows from George’s being a rational believer with 
the concept of belief. When asked whether or not you believe that 
P, like George, you usually consider the truth of P.9 The concept of 
belief is that of an attitude responsive to the truth it represents, and 
understanding this connection between belief and truth is a large part 
of having that concept. 
Having the concept of belief also means George can appreciate 
the relevance of pragmatic considerations for self-ascribing belief. 
For example, when I lose my keys, I have to look for them. Where are 
they? I don’t really know, and there is no clear evidence indicating 
their location. But I have a hunch they are in my office. In this sort of 
case, my saying “I believe the keys are in my office” is a way of making 
a guarded assertion about the location of my keys. Since George has 
conceptual mastery, he could behave the same way I do when I lose 
my keys. Like me, he could say “I believe that the keys are in my office” 
in appropriate contexts. 
On the basis of these arguments, Shoemaker concludes that George 
would self-ascribe beliefs in the exact same conditions any of us would. 
There would therefore “be nothing in his behavior, verbal or otherwise, 
that would give away the fact that he lacks self-acquaintance”. When 
9. This familiar point is found in discussions of self-knowledge that focus on its 
so-called “transparency” (e.g., Boyle 2011; Byrne 2005, 2011; Fernandez 2013; 
Moran 2001, 2012).
condition of subjects who are at least as rational and conceptually 
sophisticated as any ordinary person. 
Shoemaker actually tailors his self-blindness argument to different 
types of psychological states, but each variation rests on a version 
of a thought experiment that asks us to try to imagine a self-blind 
person with respect to a specific type of state.8 In what follows, I will 
focus primarily on beliefs, but Shoemaker’s arguments are similar for 
other attitudes. My use of the term ‘psychological attitude’ or ‘attitude’ 
is meant to apply only to attitudes that are sensitive to a subject’s 
judgments, paradigmatically beliefs, desires, and intentions (cf. 
Scanlon 1998; Hieronymi 2005). These are the focus of Shoemaker’s 
arguments, and they are also at the center of many recent discussions 
of self-knowledge (e.g., Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009, 2011; Fernandez 
2013; Gertler forthcoming; Moran 2001, 2012; Parrott 2015). So, if there 
are any attitudes that are insensitive to judgment — perhaps implicit 
attitudes or what Gendler (2008) calls “aliefs” — these will fall outside 
the scope of this essay. 
When he discusses belief, Shoemaker asks us to try to imagine a 
self-blind person that he names George. Shoemaker’s first argument 
involves Moore’s paradox. He suggests that, if George were self-blind, 
we should be able to imagine that “the total evidence available to a 
man at a given time should support the proposition that it is raining, 
while the total ‘third-person’ evidence available to him should support 
the proposition that he does not believe that it is raining” (1988, pg. 
118). In this case, it would seem reasonable for George to assert a 
Moore-paradoxical proposition like ‘It is raining, but I do not believe 
that it is raining’. But Shoemaker points out that any rational person 
can recognize a Moore-paradoxical assertion is inappropriate. Since 
we are supposing George to be fully rational, he will avoid asserting a 
Moore-paradoxical proposition. Hence, he would not attribute beliefs 
to himself in a manner that noticeably diverged from the way any of 
us would.
8. The different versions can all be found in Shoemaker (1994).
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I shall stipulate that self-blindness is impossible in order to see what 
this means for the Distinct Existence Thesis.
2. The Argument from Self-Blindness 
Shoemaker presents the self-blindness argument against a model of 
self-knowledge that he labels the “broad perceptual model”, which 
encompasses any theory of self-knowledge that is committed to the 
following two conditions:
The “causal condition” that “our beliefs about our mental 
states are caused by those mental states” and
The “independence condition” that “the existence of these 
states and events is independent of their being known in 
this way, and even of there existing the mechanisms that 
make such knowledge possible” (1994, pg. 271). 
According to Shoemaker, if the broad perceptual model were true, 
then self-blindness would be possible. Yet, although this model is 
characterized by Shoemaker in terms of these two conditions, it is 
really just the “independence condition” that figures in his argument. 
According to Shoemaker, the “logical” possibility of self-blindness is a 
“consequence of the independence condition” (1994, pg. 273; cf. 1988). 
Thus, even though what he calls the causal condition plausibly entails 
the independence condition, it is worth keeping in mind that refuting 
Shoemaker’s self-blindness argument would not demonstrate that the 
causal condition is correct. It would not demonstrate that a subject’s 
psychological state M stands in some kind of causal relation to her 
higher-order belief that she is in M. Rather, it would only show that 
we do not yet have an argument for thinking that the two stand in a 
necessary relation.12 
12. One view that therefore remains open is that a’s mental state M is a proper 
part of or partially constitutes her higher-order belief that she is in M (so 
long as the constitution relation here is not construed as identity). This would 
we try to imagine George, we can only imagine a person who reports 
beliefs just as we would, which means that we cannot really imagine 
a distinctively self-blind person. This, Shoemaker insists, just means 
that self-blindness is not a genuine possibility. If it were, “there should 
be something that would show, or at any rate provide good evidence, 
that someone was afflicted with such self-blindness” (1994, pg. 233). 
One might worry that Shoemaker’s argument is committed to some 
kind of behaviourism. But the claim he is making is not that George 
must have some type of first-person access because his observable 
behaviour indicates that he does. It may be that there are conditions 
in which it is in George’s best interest to deceive others about what 
he believes, or cases where he simply doesn’t care whether others 
know what he believes. Shoemaker’s point is that, simply by virtue 
of being rational, George will be able to reason from his awareness of 
what he takes to be true, to various types of action that are rationally 
appropriate given what he takes to be true and, crucially, in a wide 
range of contexts this will include him self-ascribing beliefs. In 
Shoemaker’s words, “he acts as if he believes that p, when he does so 
believe, which seems contrary to the supposition that he is self-blind 
with respect to his beliefs”10 (2009, pg. 37).  
It is important to keep in mind that George is supposed to be 
completely unable to become aware of his beliefs except in a third-
personal way. Even if we can conceive of someone lacking first-person 
access to some of her beliefs, this is not self-blindness. We all lack that 
kind of access to some of our beliefs some of the time, but none of us 
are self-blind. To conceive of a self-blind person, we would need to 
imagine a person who is as sophisticated as we are psychologically, 
rationally, and conceptually, without any first-person access at all. 
Is this possible? I tend to agree with Shoemaker that it is not.11 It is 
certainly difficult for me to imagine such a person. However, regardless 
of whether one could make a case for it, for the remainder of this essay, 
10. For Shoemaker’s own defense against the charge of behaviourism, see section 
2 of his (2009). 
11. Others disagree. See, for instance, Kind (2003) and Finkelstein (1999).
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Since we have already granted (2), this argument can be resisted only if 
premise (1) is wrong. Thus, we must inquire as to whether the Distinct 
Existence Thesis really does entail the possibility of self-blindness. 
Shoemaker’s argument for (1) proceeds primarily by analogy. 
Specifically, he appeals to perceptual knowledge to illustrate what it is 
for an entity to be independent from our way of knowing about it. It is 
clearly possible that material objects could exist without us and without 
any of our modes of perceptual access to them. This, Shoemaker 
claims, is a consequence of their being “logically independent” from 
our ways of knowing about them: 
The objects and states of affairs which the perception 
is of, and which it provides knowledge about, exist 
independently of the perceiving of them, and with 
certain exceptions, independently of there being things 
with the capacity for perceiving them or being aware of 
them. Thus trees, mountains, etc. can exist without there 
being creatures with the capacity to perceive them, and 
it is in principle possible for houses, automobiles and 
human bodies to exist in this way. [N.B. the exception is 
perceiving other perceivers.] (1994; pg. 254)
Just as trees and mountains could exist in a world without creatures 
capable of perceiving them, Shoemaker thinks that if beliefs were 
wholly distinct from our standard way of knowing about them, it would 
be possible for them to exist in creatures that lacked the capacity to 
access to them in a first-personal way. Thus, according to Shoemaker’s 
argument, (1) is true because the Distinct Existence Thesis entails “that 
for each kind of mental fact to which we have introspective access, it is 
at least logically possible that there should be creatures in which such 
facts obtain, and who have the ability to conceive of them, but who are 
self-blind with respect to them” (1994; pg. 273). 
This line of reasoning for (1) can be resisted. It is not true for any 
Does Shoemaker’s self-blindness argument refute the Distinct 
Existence Thesis? Shoemaker does not explicitly address the Distinct 
Existence Thesis as I have formulated it. Nonetheless, it might be thought 
that the Distinct Existence Thesis plausibly entails at least the causal 
condition that Shoemaker attributes to the broad perceptual model. 
This is because, as we have seen, the thesis commits one to thinking 
that one’s being in a psychological state M and one’s belief that one is 
in M are wholly distinct and therefore not necessarily connected. Since 
our first-personal way of knowing would therefore rest on contingent 
causal relations, the Distinct Existence Thesis would also plausibly entail 
the independence condition. It follows that if the Distinct Existence 
Thesis were true, self-blindness would be possible.
The self-blindness argument can be rendered in the form of modus 
tollens:
(1)  If the Distinct Existence Thesis is true, then self-blindness 
is possible.
(2) Self-blindness is not possible.
Thus, the Distinct Existence Thesis is not true. 
allow for the two entities to be construed as distinct in the sense required by 
Shoemaker’s independence condition: M could exist independently from a’s 
higher-order belief that a is in M (and vice versa). This is the sort of contingent 
parthood relation that holds between my left thumb and me or between 
me and my family. It has no modal implications (even if it always holds in 
normal conditions). But one might naturally call it a “constitutive” theory. 
It is nevertheless quite different from the constitutive theories prevalent in 
philosophy which are clearly presented as having modal implications. Since I 
lack space to discuss this type of view in this essay, I shall briefly mention just 
one potential problem before setting it aside. 
Many philosophers will want to hold at least some sort of weak 
supplementation principle on parthood relations. But I don’t think it is clear 
what the other non-overlapping proper parts of a’s higher-order belief that a 
is in M could be (for some very intuitive considerations in support of weak 
supplementation, see Sider 2007). For instance, Shoemaker mentions things 
like rationality, intelligence, and conceptual capacities, but it seems to me 
these might potentially violate a standard anti-symmetry principle governing 
parthood — for instance, it is plausible that truly believing that one is in M is 
part of being rational.  
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certain mental states” (1988, pg. 31). However, rather than appealing 
to the nature of certain psychological attitudes, it might be that the 
capacity for first-person access is grounded instead in the nature of our 
rationality. That is, it may be that our rational nature, rather than the 
nature or essence of any psychological attitudes, is what explains why 
self-blindness is impossible. 
To be fair, Shoemaker sometimes writes as if he has this last idea 
in mind. For instance, in one of his earlier papers, he says “it is of 
the essence of mind that each mind has a special access to its own 
contents, or more soberly expressed, that each person has a special 
access to his own mental states” (1988, pg. 115). He also makes several 
remarks about how what is “essential to a rational being” involves 
being “sensitive to the contents of one’s belief-desire system in such 
a way as to enable its contents to be revised and updated in the light 
of new experience, and enable inconsistencies and incoherences in 
its content to be eliminated” (1994, pg. 285; see also 1990). In the 
following section, I shall draw on precisely this sort of idea to argue 
that the nature of rationality can fully explain the impossibility of 
self-blindness. I take my argument to be congenial to most of what 
Shoemaker says about rational agents and rationality. But, as I shall 
argue, if the impossibility of self-blindness can be fully explained in 
this manner, we do not have to accept (1). We are not committed to 
the premise that the Distinct Existence Thesis entails the possibility of 
self-blindness, if some other feature of rational subjectivity rules it out. 
3. Rational Self-Awareness
Several philosophers writing on self-knowledge have recently stressed 
that a rational subject’s psychological attitudes like belief, desire, and 
intention are normally responsive to reasons (e.g., Bilgrami 2006; 
Boyle 2011; Moran, 2001, 2012; Parrott, 2015). For example, Richard 
Moran writes that “I take what I believe to be answerable to my sense 
of reasons and justification, and I take myself to be responsible for 
making my belief conform to my sense of the reasons in favor or 
against” (2003, pg. 405). It should be fairly uncontroversial that, as a 
entities, a and b, that if they are independent from each other, then 
there is a possible world in which a exists and b does not. If, for 
example, b were a necessary existent, then there would be no possible 
a-world that is not also a b-world, but not because the existence of a 
somehow depends on the existence of b.13 Along similar lines, if two 
properties F and G are independent from each other, this means that 
some possible individual can exemplify F without G (and vice versa). 
But there may nevertheless be a certain kind of individual, or even a 
particular individual, that cannot exemplify F without exemplifying G. 
That will happen, for example, whenever G is an essential property of 
the kind or individual (though that is not the only possible way for this 
to be the case). 
This is why Shoemaker’s analogy with material objects is misleading. 
We tend to have the intuition that trees and mountains are substances, 
which suggests that they are independent not only from our capacities 
to perceive them, but from everything else as well. It is therefore quite 
easy to envision a world with trees and mountains but no “creatures 
with the capacity to perceive them”. By contrast, psychological attitudes 
are not substances; they are properties of psychological subjects, some 
of which, like us, are rational subjects. 
The previous section’s reflections on self-blindness concern 
modality, not independence. If they are correct, they show that there 
is no possible world in which a rational subject lacks the capacity to 
access her beliefs in a distinctively first-personal way. But, to determine 
whether or not (1) is true, the relevant question is not whether this is 
the case, but why it is the case. One way to explain this necessity is 
by appealing to the nature of the underlying attitudes. Shoemaker 
typically writes as if he prefers this kind of explanation. For instance, 
he claims that a rational subject cannot be self-blind, because it is 
“the essence of many kinds of mental states to reveal themselves to 
introspection” (1994; 287). He also claims that denying the possibility 
of self-blindness amounts to holding a view about “the nature of 
13. For other examples and for discussion of the relation between modality and 
dependence, see Fine (1995). 
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them in a more third-personal manner. When someone takes up this 
sort of perspective, she treats her own beliefs similarly to the way she 
does those of others, which is to say that she treats them like facts 
that are not necessarily determined by her assessment of what is most 
reasonable to believe (cf. Moran 2012). This is because, from a third-
person point of view, a person’s best judgments about what her beliefs 
ought to be does not settle what they in fact are, and this is why critical 
judgments made from a third-personal standpoint lack an “immediate 
rationally necessary connection” to the subject’s beliefs. They are 
judgments made from a perspective that treats one’s beliefs as things 
that might not be determined by one’s rational judgments about what 
she ought to believe. 
In fact, for this reason, it seems to me that Burge overemphasizes 
the importance of critical reflection.15 It rather seems to me that a 
rational subject who has the capacity to consciously self-ascribe 
beliefs requires first-person access to them, whether or not she ever 
subjects them to deliberative or critical evaluation. This is because, 
from a rational subject’s point of view, one’s beliefs depend on 
her having adequate reasons for them.16 This is fundamental to the 
nature of the first-person perspective of a rational believer. From that 
15. Cf. Moran (2012). In contrast to Burge, Moran claims that “the non-
observational character of self-knowledge with respect to actions and 
attitudes is tied to their being expressions of the rational, active side of one’s 
nature” (2012, pg. 220; cf. 2001). He goes on to explicate this in terms of what 
he calls the “transparency condition”. 
16. What about groundless convictions, like my belief that the Lions will win 
the Super Bowl? These are surely not formed deliberatively on the basis of 
reasons or evidence. Even so, for a rational subject, we might think that these 
sorts of convictions depend on her having adequate reasons in the sense that 
once she becomes aware of compelling evidence that the belief is false (e.g., 
the Lions fail to make the playoffs), she will stop believing that the Lions 
will win the Super Bowl. It is worth noting that we might also think such a 
subject does not have the same kind of epistemic access to her groundless 
convictions. For example, it seems less likely that she could know that she 
believes that the Lions will win the Super Bowl on the basis of what Moran 
(2001) calls the “transparency method”. For further discussion of groundless 
convictions, see Martin (1998). 
rational subject, one’s beliefs are usually sensitive to evidence and to 
justifying reasons that bear on the truths they represent. If I believe 
that P and am confronted with what I take to be a conclusive reason 
that P is false, I will, insofar as I am rational, immediately stop believing 
P. In this way, my assessment of the world, my take on reasons for or 
against the truth of P, makes an immediate and substantial difference 
to the existence and character of my belief. My appreciation of reasons 
for or against my beliefs directly affects them and has the potential to 
change them. In this section, I would like to suggest that this explains 
why a rational subject with the ability to consciously self-ascribe 
beliefs must have a capacity for first-person access to them. 
Tyler Burge has stressed that having this mode of epistemic access 
is necessary for an individual to engage in what he calls  “critical 
reasoning” with respect to her beliefs.14 Burge argues that “it is 
constitutive of critical reasoning that if the reasons or assumptions 
being reviewed are justifiably found wanting by the reviewer, it 
rationally follows immediately that there is prima facie reason for 
changing or supplementing them, where this reason applies within the 
point of view of the reviewed material (not just within the reviewing 
perspective)” (1996, pg. 109; cf. Burge 1998 and Gertler forthcoming). 
Someone reasoning critically in Burge’s sense must focus her attention 
on her beliefs so that she can rationally evaluate them. This will 
sometimes culminate in a judgment to the effect that a particular 
belief is warranted or not by reasons, a judgment that Burge notes 
necessarily has the potential to immediately change the original state. 
Burge thinks that if our way of knowing about our own beliefs always 
rested on behavioral evidence, “there would never be an immediate 
rationally necessary connection” (1996, pg. 109) between what we 
deliberatively judge we ought to believe and what we in fact believe. 
Why not? 
In order for someone to engage in critical reflection, it is clear that 
she must be aware of her beliefs. Suppose she is indirectly aware of 
14. Shoemaker gives a similar argument in his 1990, 1994, and 2009.
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learned that the source of my information is not trustworthy), then, 
insofar as I am rational, I will immediately stop believing that P (cf. 
Parrott, 2015). As Burge suggests, there must be a rationally immediate 
connection between this sort of judgment about reasons and what I 
actually believe. My point is that this connection must hold in cases 
other than those where a subject critically reflects upon her beliefs.
If a rational subject’s ability to self-ascribe beliefs involves 
conceiving of them as attitudes that depend exclusively on reasons, 
then this plausibly requires one to have a mode of epistemic access 
to them that is not based on behavioral evidence. If my way of self-
attributing beliefs rested entirely on third-personal ways of knowing, 
then it would mean that, from my own perspective, my belief that P 
might depend on something other than what I regard as adequate 
reasons for holding it. This is because behavioral evidence in favor of 
the proposition that I believe that P is typically not evidence for the truth 
of the proposition P. So, if I base my attribution on such behavioral 
evidence, on something other than a reason in favor of P, it amounts to 
admitting that my belief might not depend exclusively on reasons for 
believing P. In that case, my act of self-attribution would leave open 
the possibility that there are not good reasons for believing that P. 
An example may help make this point clearer. Suppose that I come 
to know that I believe that my neighborhood is unsafe on the basis of 
behavioral evidence. I recognize, for instance, that I check the locks 
on my windows and doors much more frequently than in any other 
place I have lived. I also notice that I walk extremely quickly through 
my neighborhood and regularly glance over my shoulder. This kind of 
behavior is good evidence that I believe my neighborhood is unsafe 
and so good evidence for attributing this belief to myself. But it is not 
good evidence that the neighborhood is actually unsafe. Indeed, the 
behavioral evidence for what I believe is consistent with there being 
no reasons at all to think my neighborhood is actually unsafe. By self-
attributing a belief in this way, I leave open the possibility that what I 
believe is not determined by what I think I ought to believe. My point 
is that when a person relates to her own beliefs in a first-personal way, 
perspective, if I take myself to believe that P — which I definitely do if 
I consciously attribute the belief to myself — it is only because I take 
there to be some good reason or set of reasons in favor of the truth 
of P. Note that this does not mean that my belief that P must be the 
result of any conscious, deliberative, or reflective process; as Burge 
rightly notes, “much of our reasoning is blind, poorly accessible, and 
unaware” (1996, pg. 99; cf. Kornblith 2012). Nevertheless, as a rational 
subject, when I attribute a belief to myself, I am attributing an attitude 
that I at least tacitly conceptualize as being appropriately grounded 
in reasons for believing, even in cases where I cannot articulate what 
those reasons are.  
Some philosophers think this conception of rational belief is 
too demanding. For instance, Quassim Cassam claims that “much 
of the time, our reasoning isn’t guided by an appreciation, use, and 
assessment of reasons and reasoning as such. We are reluctant to 
criticize our reasons, and we do not guard against possible sources of 
bias” (2014, pg. 17). So it is worth emphasizing that the basic idea that 
a rational subject takes her beliefs to depend on adequate reasons for 
believing is fairly minimal. Insofar as I am rational, when I self-ascribe 
the belief that P, I do not need to grasp precisely which considerations 
are my reasons or basis for believing that P (I may have forgotten 
them), nor do I have to have formed the belief on the basis of conscious 
deliberation about some set of reasons or evidence (I often don’t do 
this). Rather, as a rational believer, I am simply committed to there 
being some sufficient reason(s) in favor of believing that P, and this is 
because my rational beliefs must be sensitive to any judgments about 
reasons that I would make.17 So, for instance, if I were to judge that there 
were absolutely no good reasons to believe that P (perhaps I have just 
17. Cassam (2014) emphasizes several ways in which human beings are 
sometimes less than rational, for instance by having recalcitrant beliefs which 
persevere in the face of counterevidence (cf. Bortolotti 2010). These are 
interesting cases, but are beyond the scope of this essay. Again, the question 
is whether, insofar as one is a rational agent, one must have a capacity for 
first-person access. If so, this is compatible with one lacking first-person 
access to a range of attitudes.  
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as Burge says, for rational judgments or evaluations to necessarily 
have an immediate consequence on what I believe. The difference 
between the third person and the first person is therefore not one of 
acquiring better epistemic reasons for taking one’s beliefs to be based 
on sufficient reasons or evidence. It is rather that only from the first-
person perspective do one’s rational judgments immediately affect 
what one believes. 
In response, someone might object that just as considering 
one’s total evidence is the most rational way to form beliefs about 
one’s neighborhood, it is also the most rational way to form beliefs 
about one’s beliefs. Indeed, it could even be argued that if a person 
is attempting to learn about what she already believes as opposed to 
what she ought to believe, she should consider every bit of available 
evidence so as not to accidentally change what she believes (Shah and 
Velleman 2005). I think there are cases where it is responsible to base 
one’s self-ascriptions on behavioral evidence. Prior to noticing my 
nervous habits, I was not aware of my belief that my neighborhood 
is unsafe. Nevertheless, that belief played a pretty important role in 
my life. It may be that the only way I could ever have learned about 
it was by noticing my nervous reactions. If so, it seems responsible to 
acquire knowledge of this belief on that basis. However, it is important 
to realize that this point does not generalize. It is not that a rational 
agent cannot sometimes self-ascribe beliefs in a third-personal way. 
But she can do so only by distancing herself or disengaging from 
the more fundamental first-person standpoint of a rational agent (cf. 
Moran 2012). If she always acquired knowledge of her beliefs in a 
third-personal way, they would remain at too far a distance from her 
sense of reasons for holding them.
The proposal sketched in this section is one way of explicating 
the idea that the impossibility of self-blindness can be accounted for 
by the nature of rationality. But absolutely nothing about it implies 
that a subject’s psychological states must be related in a way that 
is incompatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis. If our rational 
subjectivity requires first-person access to our own attitudes, then 
she must take this possibility to be closed off. From that perspective, 
she must take herself to believe that her neighborhood is unsafe 
only because that belief is adequately supported by reasons and that 
requires her to have a capacity for epistemic access to her beliefs that 
is not based on publically available behavioral evidence.18 
But couldn’t I have some reasons, perhaps even excellent ones, for 
thinking that the beliefs I ascribe even from a third-person perspective 
are based on good reasons? For instance, especially since I don’t 
remember the basis for much of what I believe, I might reasonably just 
take myself to have a general reason for thinking that all my beliefs 
are based on good reasons. So, even if I were to self-ascribe the belief 
that P from a third-person perspective, I would nonetheless take that 
belief to be appropriately grounded in reasons for believing P. It 
seems unlikely that the first-person method of self-ascription would 
give me any better reasons for thinking that my belief is appropriately 
grounded in reasons.
The point, however, is not about whether one has epistemic reasons 
for thinking that one’s beliefs are actually based on good reasons. It 
may be true that I have reasons for thinking that everything I believe 
is based on good reasons for believing. But the point is about the 
necessary “rational immediacy” of the connection between a rational 
subject’s judgments about reasons for believing and the things she 
actually does believe. It is internal to the first-person perspective of 
a rational subject that the beliefs one self-ascribes are immediately 
sensitive to the judgments one makes.
 By contrast, self-ascribing the belief that P on the basis of 
behavioural evidence leaves open the possibility that what I believe 
diverges from my own rational assessment of reasons right now, at the 
moment of self-ascription. A third-personal mode of self-ascription 
leaves open the possibility that, if I were to reconsider the question 
of whether P, I might come to a conclusion that diverges from what I 
actually believe. That is a possibility that must be closed off in order, 
18. Moran (2001), I think, is getting at a similar thought when he describes first-
personal self-knowledge as a “rational requirement”. 
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in the previous section to be making a claim about a different sort of 
necessary constitutive relation.  
To see this, we can express the proposal from the previous section 
using the ‘part of what it is to be’ operator: 
Belief Rationality 1: Part of what it is for a to believe that P 
is for a to be disposed to make the appropriate judgments 
about reasons. 
Indeed, since beliefs are frequently thought to be dispositions or sets 
of dispositions, it is quite easy to see how they might be either identical 
to, or partially constituted by, a subject’s dispositions to judge certain 
things (cf. Schwitzgebel 2002).21 Moreover, if we interpret the previous 
section’s proposal along these lines, Belief Rationality 1 would have 
modal implications; for instance, necessarily (if a believes that P, then 
a is disposed to judge [in the right circumstances] that P is true). 
I don’t think it is obviously wrong to think that part of what it is 
for a rational subject to believe that P is for her to have dispositions 
to judge certain things. Nevertheless, I think this is not the best way 
to understand the relation between belief and judgment. The issue 
comes down to whether or not we are inclined to think that a rational 
subject can believe that P without having the appropriate dispositions. 
For instance, could a rational subject believe that P and be disposed to 
judge that evidence conclusively shows P is true but then, for various 
reasons, lose this disposition while nevertheless retaining the belief? 
If this sort of thing can happen, then it does not seem quite right to 
think that part of what it is for a to believe that P is for a to be disposed 
to judge that the evidence shows P is true. 
One might object that this sort of behavior would indicate some 
kind of irrationality on the part of the subject. That is, someone who 
21. One might also think that beliefs are constitutively related to other beliefs 
such that, for instance, part of what it is for a to believe that P is for a to believe 
that Q. It seems to me that the reasons given in this section against Belief 
Rationality 1 would also be reasons to avoid this sort of view in favour of one 
analogous to Belief Rationality 2. 
we do not have a reason for denying that those attitudes are wholly 
distinct existences.
4. Dependence
The previous explanation of first-person access rests on the claim that 
a rational subject’s beliefs depend on her sense of reasons for them. 
It is important to clarify this. A number of philosophers employ the 
phrase ‘sense of reasons’, but in doing so, they can mean very different 
things.19 One might mean to refer to a subject’s actual judgments, 
either implicit or explicit, about reasons for or against her beliefs. Or, 
alternatively, one might mean to refer to a subject’s dispositions to 
judge certain things about reasons. I prefer the second interpretation 
of ‘sense of reasons’. Notice, however, that even if we were to adopt 
the former, the claim that a subject’s beliefs depend on her actual 
judgments about reasons is not obviously a claim with any modal 
implications. If an agent explicitly and consciously judges that there 
are conclusive reasons against the truth of P, her belief that P might 
cease to exist, but it might also persist despite her well-considered 
judgment (cf. Cassam 2014, chapter 2). This sort of thing should be 
familiar, and it shows, I think, that a rational subject’s beliefs can 
persist independently of her actual judgments about reasons.20
On my preferred interpretation, the central claim of the previous 
section is that a rational subject’s belief that P depends on her being 
disposed to judge in the right circumstances that reasons adequately 
support the truth of P. Although this is consistent with the Distinct 
Existence Thesis as formulated, one might naturally worry that it goes 
against the spirit of the thesis. Specifically, one might take the proposal 
19. This language is prominent in Moran (2001, 2012). However, it is not clear 
to me which of the interpretations presented in this section, if either, Moran 
would favor. 
20. It is worth noting that even if one were inclined for some reason to think 
a subject’s beliefs did depend on her actual judgments, this would still be 
very different from the sort of relation we have been considering in this essay 
insofar as it would be compatible with the subject’s beliefs being wholly 
distinct from her higher-order beliefs about them.
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as Cassam notes, “the more long-standing and deeply embedded your 
belief that P the harder you may find to shake it off when confronted 
by evidence which you realize undermines it” (2014, pg. 23). This 
suggests that one’s belief can persist even after one’s dispositions have 
changed.22 
If, as a rational agent, I am able to retain the belief that my 
neighborhood is unsafe even when I am no longer disposed to judge 
that it is, then it is less plausible to think that the belief itself depends 
on my dispositions to judge. Of course, once I lose the appropriate 
dispositions, my belief plausibly becomes irrational, even by my own 
lights, which means it changes in an extremely significant respect. 
But it notably does not cease to exist. This suggests that it is the 
rationality of my belief, rather than its existence, that depends on my 
dispositions to make the appropriate judgments. I therefore propose 
that we understand the idea that a rational subject’s beliefs depend on 
22. Someone might argue that, even in cases like my neighborhood example, a 
subject does not really lose the dispositions to judge that P is true or supported 
by good reasons; it is just that the dispositions are masked in some way. One 
might therefore argue that even after the neighborhood becomes safe, I retain 
the disposition to judge it is unsafe; it is just that that disposition is inhibited. 
Although this alternative way of describing the case is available, I think there 
are at least two reasons to resist it. First, we might think an individual simply 
cannot have directly opposing dispositions. For example, a person cannot 
simultaneously be disposed to blink and be disposed to not blink in the same 
circumstances (cf. Handfield and Bird, 2008). Secondly, with respect to an 
ability to act in a certain way, one might be disposed to exercise the ability 
in a specific manner or toward a particular end (e.g., one might be disposed 
to run slowly, or for ten miles); however, in such cases, we tend to think that 
the individual’s disposition can be masked only by something external to the 
agent, not by one of the agent’s intrinsic properties. We can perhaps imagine 
a case in which someone is disposed to judge that P but bizarre events 
bring about the opposite judgment (this is the sort of thing that happens 
in Frankfurt-style cases). Yet, if nothing extrinsic to the agent causes her to 
judge that P, if that judgment is her successful intentional action, it is hard to 
see how the person could also have some masked disposition to judge that 
not P. Similarly, if a person deliberates on the safety of the neighborhood 
and judges it to be safe, there is something odd about thinking they have 
somehow failed to exercise the disposition to judge it unsafe. 
forms a belief on the basis of a deliberative judgment that P is true, 
but then retains that belief despite losing her disposition to judge 
that P is true, might seem to be manifestly irrational. But since a is by 
hypothesis a rational subject, it does not matter whether an irrational 
believer could continue to believe something without retaining the 
sorts of dispositions one finds in rational subjects. Yet, it does not seem 
to me that losing the disposition to judge that P is true, or is adequately 
supported by evidence, automatically impugns the rationality of a 
believer. Indeed, in paradigmatic cases of rational belief revision, there 
will be an interval where a subject both believes that P and lacks the 
dispositions to judge that P is true, or likely to be true, or adequately 
supported by evidence. It seems to me that sometimes that interval 
can be quite significant. 
Let’s return to the belief that my neighborhood is unsafe. Suppose 
now that I believe this not out of fear or paranoia but because it is 
actually not safe. Imagine that the rate of violent crime is unusually 
high, that burglaries are common, and that most of the neighborhood 
residents are armed. In such a scenario, it is reasonable to think I would 
both be disposed to judge and rationally believe that my neighborhood 
is not safe. Let’s suppose this is true. But now imagine that over a 
number of years my neighborhood is the target of major government 
intervention. Police presence increases and there is an influx of private 
investment. Both unemployment and criminal activity decline and, 
over time, the neighborhood slowly becomes safe. Noticing these 
gradual changes, I get to the point where I am no longer disposed to 
judge that my neighborhood is unsafe. For example, if someone were to 
ask me whether it was, I would say “No.” Despite my acknowledgment 
of the newfound safety of the neighborhood, it seems possible that I 
continue to believe that the neighborhood is unsafe. This might involve 
me manifesting behavior such as glancing nervously over my shoulder 
or installing extra locks on my house. We know that an individual can 
have beliefs like this, beliefs that are discordant with what they are 
disposed to judge (cf. Peacocke 1998; Cassam 2014). It also seems to 
me that beliefs of this sort can persist for a fair amount of time. Indeed, 
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rational, not the underlying natures or essences of those attitudes.25 
It would therefore be wrong to conclude from the fact that a rational 
agent must have certain kinds of dispositions that this is because the 
existences of certain kinds of attitudes in her psychological life are, by 
their very nature, necessarily connected to those dispositions. 
We are now in a position to see a second respect in which first-
person access is epistemically distinctive when compared to the kind 
of epistemic access we have toward the psychological attitudes of 
others (the first, which we have already seen, is that it is not based on 
behavioral evidence). It is plausible that if someone has a capacity for 
first-person access, which is an epistemic capacity, she will thereby 
be disposed to form higher-order beliefs about her own psychological 
attitudes. Why is that? Generally, it seems that whenever a capacity 
does not require exercising volition, having the capacity to Ф entails 
being disposed to Ф.26 Moreover, since exercising one’s epistemic 
capacity for first-person access would involve forming a higher-order 
belief about one’s attitudes, it means that anyone with a capacity for 
first-person access would be disposed to form higher-order beliefs 
about her own psychological attitudes. However, I have also argued 
that it is necessary that a rational subject have first-person access to her 
psychological attitudes, which suggests the following line of argument:
25. But what if a subject’s judgments are irrational? Wouldn’t making an 
irrational judgment about reasons determine that a subject’s beliefs are 
also irrational? I think it depends. A subject’s belief can be epistemically 
irrational if it is formed on the basis of an epistemically irrational judgment, 
which is not correctable because, for example, we cannot get the subject to 
properly evaluate the available evidence (there is a question as to when this 
sort of recalcitrance becomes delusional; cf. Bortolotti 2010). This kind of 
irrationality of one’s belief is derived from the epistemic irrationality of one’s 
judgment. Part of what the discussion in this essay brings out is that there is 
a different kind of irrationality implicated in cases where one’s beliefs come 
apart from what one is disposed to judge. This sense of irrationality might 
best be characterized in terms of a kind of dissociation, or alienation, but it is 
clearly possible even in cases where a subject’s judgments about reasons for 
belief are epistemically flawless.
26. This assumption that first-person access is a non-voluntary epistemic capacity 
is one reason to think that what Shoemaker calls “first-person agnosticism” 
(1990) is impossible. 
her sense of reasons as claiming that one’s beliefs are rational in virtue 
of one’s dispositions to make appropriate judgments about reasons.23 
We can still use the ‘part of what it is to be’ operator to express this 
sort of dependence:  
Belief Rationality 2: Part of what it is for a to rationally 
believe that P is for a to be disposed to make the 
appropriate judgments about reasons.
Like its ancestor, Belief Rationality 2 will have modal implications. For 
instance, necessarily (if a rationally believes that P, then a is disposed to 
judge [in the right circumstances] that P is true). The crucial difference 
between this formulation and Belief Rationality 1 is that ‘rationality’ 
now serves to modify a’s belief that P. This reflects the fact that it is the 
rationality of one’s belief that depends on one having the appropriate 
dispositions to judge that P is true, or likely to be true, or supported by 
evidence. If one loses those dispositions, then one’s belief may persist, 
but it would be irrational. However, an instance of an irrational belief 
does not indicate that the subject of that belief fails to be rational. 
Rational subjects sometimes believe irrational things — indeed they 
sometimes consciously believe irrational things. Our rationality is far 
from perfect. 
My thinking about dependence in this manner is motivated, in 
part, by the thought that rationality does not demarcate a natural 
psychological kind.24 So, although my rationally believing that P and my 
rationally desiring that P are ways in which I exemplify a psychological 
property (i.e., desire or belief), rational belief and rational desire are not 
themselves psychological kinds. If this is right, it means that a subject’s 
way of relating to her attitudes determines whether or not they are 
23. Some people (but only some) use the term ‘grounding’ for the type of relation 
I have in mind. For further discussion, see Audi (2012) and Rosen (2010). 
24. This may mean that my conception of rational attitudes is committed to 
what Boyle calls an “additive theory” of rationality (2016). Boyle raises two 
objections to additive theories, which I think could be extended to the sort of 
view I’m sketching in this essay. But I lack space to address them in this essay. 
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capacity does not itself imply anything about the epistemic status 
of one’s higher-order beliefs, and in particular it does not imply that 
they are epistemically authoritative or privileged, it is nevertheless 
a peculiar epistemic capacity insofar as a rational agent can exercise 
it only with respect to her own attitudes. Nevertheless, even if one 
denies that this feature of First-Personal Dispositions is sufficient to 
capture the special epistemic status of the first person, what is crucial 
for the purposes of this essay is that the conception of first-person 
access embodied in First-Personal Dispositions is compatible with the 
Distinct Existence Thesis.29 
5. Luminosity and Fallibility
In the previous section, we saw that a rational subject with a capacity 
for first-person access will be disposed to form higher-order beliefs 
about the psychological attitudes she actually has (First-Personal 
Dispositions), which means that those higher-order beliefs will be true. 
Some philosophers might worry that this conclusion would mean that 
a certain range of psychological attitudes are self-intimating, since it 
claims that, as a matter of necessity, if a rational subject exemplifies 
one of these attitudes, she will be disposed to believe (truly) that she 
29. It is worth noting that, according to this view, it is much less clear that first-
person access is epistemically distinctive when we compare it to perception. 
To the extent that perception is an epistemic capacity, having a capacity for 
perceptual access to some range of facts plausibly entails being disposed to 
form beliefs about them. We could then construct a parallel argument for 
creatures that we define as “perceptual subjects”, subjects whom we define as 
necessarily having a capacity for perceptual access. If perceptual access is also 
epistemically “direct”, or not based on evidence or inference, which seems 
extremely plausible, then it would be epistemically analogous to first-person 
access. Thus, if one thinks first-person access must be epistemically different 
from perceptual access, one will think First-Personal Dispositions does not 
secure enough epistemic distinctiveness. Often, Shoemaker’s self-blindness 
argument is cited in opposition to views that assimilate first-person access 
to perception, but, as we saw earlier, that argument does not support the 
conclusion that such assimilation makes self-blindness possible. Are there 
other reasons to sharply distinguish the epistemic properties of first-person 
access from those of perception? Perhaps, but addressing this question is 
beyond the scope of this essay.
(3)  Necessarily, for any rational subject a and 
psychological attitude M, if M(a), then a has a capacity 
for first-person access to M(a).
(4)  Necessarily, for any rational subject a and 
psychological attitude M, if M(a) and a has the 
capacity for first-person access to M(a), then a is 
disposed to believe (first-personally) that M(a).27 
First-Personal Dispositions: Necessarily, for any rational 
subject a and psychological attitude M, (if M(a), then a is 
disposed to believe [first-personally] that M(a)).28
Earlier I conceded to Shoemaker that it is impossible for a rational 
subject to lack the capacity for first-person access, but it now seems 
that this would mean it is impossible for a rational subject to lack a 
disposition to form true higher-order beliefs about her psychological 
attitudes. Because the first-person mode of epistemic access is 
something that a rational subject must have toward her attitudes, and 
because it implies the existence of this disposition, it looks different 
from the types of epistemic access we have to the attitudes of others. 
The epistemic capacities that allow me to access your attitudes and 
form beliefs about them do not seem to involve me having any 
disposition to form true beliefs about the attitudes you have — certainly 
not as a matter of necessity. Therefore, since the view I sketched in the 
previous section implies First-Personal Dispositions, it can be thought 
to validate the intuition that first-person access to one’s own mental 
states is epistemically distinctive — it is a necessary epistemic capacity 
for rational subjects that brings with it a disposition to form true 
beliefs about one’s own psychological attitudes. Although having this 
27. There will naturally be instances in which this disposition is masked. I 
am grateful to Nick Jones for his assistance in helping me formulate this 
argument. 
28. It is worth keeping in mind that First-Personal Dispositions applies to 
judgment-sensitive attitudes. What should we think about a rational agent’s 
sharp credence like .4532? Is this a judgment-sensitive attitude? This is a good 
question, and it will be addressed in the following section. 
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assume that a’s disposition to believe that M(a) is sufficiently reliable. 
First-Personal Dispositions claims that a rational agent will be disposed 
to believe that she exemplifies a psychological attitude whenever 
she does. But it does not say anything about dispositions one might 
have to form beliefs in other conditions. So, nothing in the argument 
excludes a from being disposed to form the higher-order belief that 
M(a) in cases where it would be false. However, if that were the case, 
(6) would be quite obviously false. Thus, one would want to insist 
that a’s disposition to form the belief that M(a) whenever a is in M 
is epistemically reliable. Alternatively, one could argue that a rational 
subject is disposed to form accurate higher-order beliefs about absences 
of psychological attitudes, which would have the consequence of 
ensuring reliability as long as we ban explicit contradictions.  
However, even if we were to make one of these two assumptions, 
(6) would still be false. Being disposed to truly believe that one 
exemplifies some attitude is not sufficient for being in a position to 
know that one does. This is because we are sometimes disposed to 
believe that a certain condition obtains in cases where we would have 
the same disposition in very similar cases where the condition does 
not obtain. In the good case, where a is disposed to believe that M(a) 
and M(a) is the case, her belief will be true, but the truth of this belief 
would be accidental if she were to have the same disposition in nearby 
cases where it is not the case that M(a). Therefore, the disposition to 
form a true belief about one’s psychological state in the good case 
would not be sufficient to put one in a position to know in that case. 
Indeed, this is one of the central lessons of Williamson’s argument 
against luminosity. 
Consider a series of times t1, t2, … tn, such that one rationally 
believes that P at t1 and no longer believes it at tn. Suppose further 
that one’s degree of confidence in P gradually diminishes over the 
course of this interval. There will then be some time ti such that one’s 
one’s confidence is still high enough to count as believing that P at ti 
but then, at ti+1, one’s degree of confidence drops below the threshold 
for believing that P. Assuming that First-Personal Dispositions is true, 
does. In other words, some might worry that First-Personal Dispositions 
would make certain attitudes luminous, at least for rational subjects. 
As Williamson defines it, an attitude is luminous “if and only if, 
necessarily, whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it 
obtains” (2008, pg. 279). If one is convinced by Williamson’s influential 
argument against luminosity, then one will want to insist that no 
psychological attitude is luminous.30 This is an important objection, 
because, as we shall see, it is partially with respect to the possibility 
of luminosity that the sort of account presented in this essay diverges 
from mainstream constitutive theories of self-knowledge.
The reason someone might suspect that First-Personal Dispositions 
implies that a rational subject’s attitudes are luminous is because she 
thinks that being disposed to believe that one exemplifies an attitude 
that one actually has, as First-Personal Dispositions claims, is equivalent 
to, or at least implies, being in a position to know that one exemplifies 
that attitude. That is, one might reason as follows:
(5)  Necessarily, for any rational subject a and 
psychological attitude M, (if M(a), then a is disposed 
to believe [first-personally] that M(a)). (First-Personal 
Dispositions)
(6)  Necessarily, if, whenever M(a), a is disposed to 
believe that M(a), then a is in a position to know that 
M(a). 
(7)  Therefore, necessarily, for any rational subject a 
and psychological attitude M, (if M(a), then a is in a 
position to know that M(a)). 
This argument would establish that the psychological attitudes of 
rational subjects are luminous (7). 
In order for this argument to be credible, we would at least need to 
30. Williamson’s (2000) version of the argument is presented in terms of 
sensations. Offhand, one might therefore think it applies only to phenomenal 
states. However, as we will see, the argument can be extended to attitudes 
like belief (cf. Silins 2012). 
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case might look to be inconsistent with First-Personal Dispositions. The 
latter would imply that at ti+1the subject would have a disposition to 
believe that she is agnostic about P. However, according to the anti-
luminosity argument, at ti + 1 the subject retains the disposition from 
ti, which is to say that she is disposed to believe that she believes that 
P. This might be taken to indicate that there is something wrong with 
First-Personal Dispositions.  
If we want to maintain First-Personal Dispositions, I think we should 
admit that, in a borderline case like ti + 1, a subject can have two 
dispositions, specifically the disposition to believe that she believes 
that P and the disposition to believe that she is agnostic about P. Having 
these two dispositions is not contradictory, so it is not impossible for 
a subject to have them both. There may seem to be something slightly 
odd about having both of these dispositions simultaneously, but let’s 
keep in mind that borderline cases are non-standard.  
To help alleviate the sense of oddity, let me clarify my conception 
of first-person access. On the sort of view presented in this essay, a 
rational subject must have a capacity for a special mode of epistemic 
access to her psychological attitudes. In the previous section, I argued 
that part of having this capacity involves having a general disposition 
to form higher-order beliefs about one’s attitudes. In the majority of 
cases where this disposition is exercised, a subject will actually form a 
higher-order belief about the attitudes she actually has. So, in ordinary 
circumstances, her higher-order beliefs will be true. However, this 
disposition is not always exercised, and it can also be masked. This 
means that there may be cases where a rational subject will have the 
disposition to form a higher-order belief about her psychological 
attitude but not exercise it by actually forming a belief about the attitude 
she has. I would suggest that this is what happens in the sorts of 
borderline cases we find in Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. If I 
am in a borderline case where it is very difficult to distinguish whether 
or not I believe that P or I am agnostic about P, it does not seem that 
strange to think I may have both a disposition to believe that I believe 
that P and a disposition to believe that I am agnostic about P. From 
we can stipulate that at ti one is disposed to believe that one believes 
that P, but, as Williamson argues, one’s higher-order belief at ti would 
not constitute knowledge, because it could easily have been false. It is 
extremely likely that one would retain the disposition to believe that 
one believes that P at ti+1, since the difference between one’s degrees 
of confidence at ti and ti+1 is likely to be indistinguishable. But if one 
would retain this disposition at ti+1 (where, by hypothesis, the relevant 
condition does not obtain), then one would not be in a position to 
know that the relevant condition obtains in ti. So the disposition to 
believe that one has a psychological attitude whenever one does have 
it is not sufficient to put one in a position to know that one does. First-
Personal Dispositions does not entail that any type of psychological 
attitude is luminous. 
This formulation of the anti-luminosity argument raises two 
interesting questions about the status of First-Personal Dispositions that 
are worth further consideration. First, the subject in the example is not 
sensitive to fine-grained changes in her degrees of confidence between 
ti and ti + 1. This raises a question about whether degrees of confidence 
are even the sort of attitude that falls within the proprietary domain of 
first-person access. If they are not, then it would not indicate anything 
about one’s capacity for first-person access if one did not have accurate 
beliefs about fine-grained credence in the truth of P. There are certain 
properties of material objects that cannot be perceptually accessed, 
but that doesn’t mean our visual system is impaired.31 
Second, according to the argument, in the borderline case ti+1, the 
subject has a psychological attitude that is by hypothesis not a state of 
believing that P. We might think of it as a state of suspended judgment, 
or agnosticism about P. But this means that prima facie the borderline 
31. If we think of credences as distinct kinds of psychological states, it may be 
sufficient to secure rationality that a subject is disposed to form true beliefs 
about intervals of probability. This would require us to modify First-Personal 
Dispositions somewhat, but it would be in the same spirit. But it may also be 
better to think of a subject’s degrees of confidence not as credal states but as 
beliefs about probabilities; see for instance the arguments of Friedman (2013) 
and Sturgeon (2015). Thanks to an anonymous reader for raising the issues 
discussed in this paragraph. 
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this belief. The possibility of ignorance of one’s own attitudes suggests 
that they are not luminous.  
The luminosity of psychological attitudes is incompatible with the 
first clause of the Distinct Existence Thesis, the clause which denies that 
part of what it is to be in M is to believe (first-personally) that one is 
in M. So, it is possible for a constitutive theorist to reject luminosity 
but deny the second clause of the Distinct Existence Thesis. This sort 
of constitutive view would be committed to the claim that at least 
some of a subject’s higher-order beliefs are infallible, because it would 
hold that part of what it is to be such a higher-order belief is for the 
subject to exemplify the embedded attitude. However, it would not be 
committed to the luminosity of any first-order attitudes and so could 
easily accommodate the possibility of self-ignorance
However, there is a parallel reason to be suspicious of a constitutive 
theory committed to some sort of infallibility, namely that it seems 
that we can be mistaken about our own psychological attitudes (cf. 
Snowdon 2012). This suggests that our first-personal way of knowing, 
however special it may be, is fallible. Notably our commonsense 
picture of positive self-deception is that it consists in a subject 
incorrectly believing that she has a particular attitude that she lacks.33
Constitutive theorists are naturally aware of these putative 
counterexamples, and they seek to accommodate them in one of 
two ways: First, several constitutive theorists restrict the scopes of 
their theses to one or more privileged kinds of attitude. For instance, 
Bilgrami and Coliva both distinguish a special kind of attitude that 
they call “commitment” (which includes ordinary beliefs and desires) 
and argue that there is a necessary constitutive connection between 
a subject’s psychological attitudes and her higher-order beliefs only 
when the former are “commitments” (Bilgrami 2006; cf. Coliva 2012). 
According to this proposal, cases of self-ignorance involve an entirely 
different kind of state, a kind that, as Bilgrami says, “cannot possibly 
33. Even though there are many disagreements in the literature on self-deception, 
theorists tend to agree that the explanandum involves a false higher-order 
belief. For discussion, see chapter 6 of Fernandez (2013). 
this, nothing would follow about what a rational subject is disposed 
to believe in non-borderline cases. It therefore remains plausible that 
rational subjects are typically in a position to know about their own 
attitudes. The point of the anti-luminosity argument is simply to show 
that no psychological attitude guarantees that one will be in such a 
position. 
By contrast, many constitutive theories do tend to maintain that 
at least some psychological attitudes are luminous (e.g., Bilgrami 
2006; Coliva 2009, 2012; Shoemaker 2012; Zimmerman 2006). This 
should not be surprising. Taking one’s psychological attitudes to be 
necessarily connected to one’s higher-order beliefs certainly makes 
luminosity seem attractive.32 For instance, if, following Boyle, we were 
to think that one’s attitudes are simply identical to one’s true higher-
order beliefs about them, it would be very hard to see how one could 
fail to be in a position to know about an attitude whenever it obtained. 
By contrast, because it does not posit any necessary relation between 
a subject’s psychological attitudes and her higher-order beliefs 
about them, the framework presented in this essay can simply deny 
luminosity. But is this a reason to prefer it?
Instances of self-ignorance present one reason to be suspicious of 
a constitutive theory committed to some form of luminosity. There 
is plenty of evidence demonstrating that individuals often have 
psychological attitudes that they are completely unaware of having 
(for a survey of some relevant experimental work, see Jost et al. 2009). 
To modify an example of Peacocke’s (1998), I might have a belief that 
degrees from my own university are far superior to those from other 
institutions. Nevertheless, were someone to ask me what I believe, 
even if I were to consider the matter carefully, I could fail to be aware of 
32. For a nice argument that constitutive views are nevertheless susceptible 
to Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, see Srinivasan (2015). The most 
popular constitutive theories discussed in the literature do not tend to think 
that only one of the two clauses of the Distinct Existence Thesis is mistaken, 
perhaps for the reason that Shoemaker (1990) gives: if we prohibit self-
contradictions and first-person agnosticism, luminosity and infallibility seem 
roughly equivalent. For some other reasons to think these two notions go 
together, see Bilgrami (2006).  
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and Shoemaker suggests that M(a) plus C entails a believing that M(a). 
On either view, a subject’s psychological attitude stands in a necessary 
constitutive relation to her higher-order belief, but the holding of this 
relation is conditional on something else — rationality, conceptual 
sophistication, or whatever. The constitutive theorist can then argue 
that self-ignorance or error occur only when conditions C fail to hold.35 
There is no space remaining in this essay to fully discuss the various 
ways in which a constitutive theorist can try to account for cases 
of self-ignorance or error. So, it is important to understand that the 
challenge these cases pose for constitutive theories of self-knowledge 
is an explanatory one. It is not that constitutive views make either 
self-ignorance or error impossible; it is rather that they significantly 
complicate their intelligibility. As we have just seen, there are a number 
of things a constitutive theorist could say to accommodate prima facie 
counterexamples to her theory. However, the constitutive theorist is 
forced to turn to comparatively more complicated explanations for 
instances of self-error or ignorance.36 By contrast, if we adopt a view 
that is compatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis, much simpler 
explanations become available. For example, one might pursue the 
promising idea that we sometimes make mistakes about our beliefs 
because distraction or fatigue masks our standing disposition (First-
Personal Dispositions) to form higher-order beliefs about them. This is 
35. Although I lack space to discuss the merits of this sort of proposal in detail, 
I think that one might reasonably question whether conditional necessities 
are really necessities. If there are some conditions in which an X can fail to 
stand in a relation to Y, then it seems like the two are not really necessarily 
connected. They may well stand in that relation in every world in which some 
further condition C holds, but we might question whether that is sufficient 
for necessity. For further discussion, see Wilson (2010). Of course, it might 
still be true that in ordinary psychological conditions, if one a is in M then 
a will believe that M(a) (or vice versa), but since this isn’t necessary it is 
compatible with the Distinct Existence Thesis. The fact that most people know 
about their own psychological attitudes, or are at least in a position to, is an 
explanandum for a theory of self-knowledge. Non-constitutive theories will 
presumably need to account for this on the basis of the reliability of certain 
contingent relations. 
36. For an example of the kind of explanatory epicycles I have in mind, see 
Horgan and Kriegel (2007).
have the normative property of commitments” (2006, pg. 315). 
Similarly, Horgan and Kriegel (2007) defend an infallibility thesis, but 
they explicitly restrict it to beliefs about the phenomenal properties of 
one’s conscious experiences. So, it is possible for a constitutive theorist 
to maintain either of the claims denied by the Distinct Existence Thesis, 
just as long as they restrict the scope of their central thesis. They can 
then insist that cases of either self-ignorance or self-error occur only 
with respect to psychological kinds that fall outside of some privileged 
class.34 
There is a second option available to a constitutive theorist seeking 
to accommodate self-ignorance or fallibility, which is to argue that 
there are some additional background conditions on the relevant 
constitutive relations holding. According to this line of thought, it 
is not that the attitudes of which we are ignorant or mistaken make 
up a distinct psychological kind; it is rather that unless certain 
crucial conditions are met, a subject’s psychological attitudes are 
not necessarily connected to her higher-order beliefs about them. 
This is the sort of constitutive view associated with Shoemaker, who 
frequently stresses that one needs rationality and conceptual capacities 
in addition to first-order attitudes in order to “automatically” have a 
true second-order belief (1994, pg. 288; cf. 2009). A similar thought is 
expressed by Jane Heal’s claim that a “second-level belief contributes 
a necessary element to a set of conditions which are jointly sufficient 
for the first-level state” (2001, pg. 5, emphasis added). Someone who 
holds this sort of constitutive view is thinking of the relation between 
a’s belief that M(a) and M(a) as a sort of conditional necessity. Call 
the relevant background conditions C. Heal’s suggestion is basically 
that, necessarily, a’s believing that M(a) plus C is sufficient for M(a), 
34. Some constitutive theorists also reject the notion that self-deception involves 
an incorrect belief about one’s attitudes. For instance, both Bilgrami (2006) 
and Shoemaker (2009) argue that self-deceived subjects have true beliefs 
about their attitudes, but also have a belief that is inconsistent with the one 
they self-ascribe. I assume that there are cases of self-error that are not self-
deception, and so a constitutive theorist will need to adopt an additional 
strategy as well. 
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